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DUE PROCESS IN AIA PROCEEDINGS
AFTER SAS INSTITUTE INC. V. IANCU
MIKAELA STONE & BRITTON DAVIS

I. INTRODUCTION
Following the Supreme Court’s recent abolishment of partial
institution decisions in inter partes reviews of patents, in SAS Institute Inc.
v. Iancu (“SAS II”),1 the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) runs a
greater risk than it previously did of due process violations in its final
written decisions. Because all claims will be instituted if a reasonable
likelihood of success is found for even one claim, the PTAB may have less
incentive to provide the same depth of analysis previously provided in the
institution decision for all claims and all grounds. Less analysis early-on by
the PTAB means the parties have less notice of the PTAB’s positions and,
thus, less of a meaningful opportunity to be heard, increasing the risk that
any change of position by the PTAB at a final written decision will result in
a due process violation against petitioners and patent owners. Because of
this, SAS II may have the practical impact of placing an additional onus on
patent owners to set forth in their preliminary response any arguments that
might, if institution is granted, serve as a basis for the PTAB finding claims
not unpatentable, to decrease the likelihood that such a final written
decision will be found to violate petitioners’ due process rights.
This article begins by discussing the boundaries that due process and
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) impose on the actions of
administrative adjudicatory bodies like the PTAB. The article then analyzes
how the Supreme Court’s SAS II decision disincentivizes fulsome analysis
by the PTAB in its institution decisions, the additional burden faced by
patent owners electing to file a preliminary response, and the attendant

1. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).
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increased risk of due process violations by the PTAB. Finally, this article
concludes with recommendations for practitioners and a discussion of what
is necessary to preserve a party’s right to appeal a due process violation.
II. DUE PROCESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AT THE
PTAB
A. The Administrative Procedure Act Protects Both Patent Owners
and Petitioners
America Invents Act (“AIA”) proceedings are subject to due process
limits and the APA,2 which provides, inter alia, that “[p]ersons entitled to
notice of an agency hearing shall be timely informed of . . . the matters of
fact and law asserted.” 3 This protection has always been understood to
apply to patent owners because they are in danger of losing their
intellectual property. 4 In addition, the Federal Circuit has identified two
reasons to support the application of the APA’s protections to petitioners as
well. First, the Court has cited the APA’s coverage of “[p]ersons entitled to
notice of an agency hearing,” explaining that “[i]n an IPR proceeding, this
class of persons includes the petitioner.”5 Second, the Court explained:
[A]ffording petitioners with the benefit of § 554(b)(3) is appropriate
because petitioners are not disinterested parties in an IPR
proceeding. Rather, petitioners stand to lose significant rights in an
instituted IPR proceeding because of the estoppel effects that trigger
against them if the Board issues a final written decision. 6

The rationale behind the inter partes review estoppel provision, 35
U.S.C. § 315(e), was to prevent successive challenges to a patent by those
2. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 889 F.3d 1308, 1316
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (“We review Board decisions using the standard set forth in the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706 et seq.”); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131,
2142 (2016) (“‘[S]henanigans’ may be properly reviewable in the context of § 319 and under the
Administrative Procedure Act, which enables reviewing courts to ‘set aside agency action’ that is
‘contrary to constitutional right,’ ‘in excess of statutory jurisdiction,’ or ‘arbitrary [and] capricious.’”);
SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1360.
3. 5 U.S.C. § 554(b)(3) (2012).
4. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1369 (2018)
(“The decisions should not be misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not property for purposes of
the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.”).
5. SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC (SAS I), 825 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d
on other grounds, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 554(b)(3)).
6. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012)).
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who previously have had the opportunity to challenge the patent before the
PTAB.7 However, the application of this estoppel provision presumes that a
party has previously had the opportunity to challenge the patent. To ensure
that estoppel is not wrongfully applied to petitioners who did not have that
opportunity, it is necessary to afford a petitioner the protections of the
APA, as well as the right to appeal alleged violations.8
B. The PTAB’s Boundaries Under Due Process and the Administrative
Procedure Act
Under the APA, the Federal Circuit is required to “hold unlawful and
set aside agency action . . . not in accordance with law [or] . . . without
observance of procedure required by law.”9 “The indispensable ingredients
of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard by a disinterested
decision-maker.”10 As such, the APA requires the PTAB to timely inform a
party of the “matters of fact and law asserted” and provide an opportunity
to submit facts and argument.11
The Federal Circuit has explained that to ensure that both parties are
properly afforded notice and the opportunity to be heard, an agency may
not “change theories in midstream without giving respondents reasonable
notice of the change and the opportunity to present argument under the new
theory.”12 In applying this test to PTAB proceedings, the Federal Circuit
has focused its analysis on whether the new theory served as the basis for

7. See Aruze Gaming Macau, Ltd. v. MGT Gaming, Inc., No. IPR2014-01288, Paper 13 at 14
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 20, 2015); see also 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012).
8. It is worth noting that Courts have called into question whether the estoppel faced by nonpracticing petitioners is enough to support standing for an appeal to an Article III court. See Consumer
Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261–63 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Phigenix, Inc v.
Immunogen, Inc., 845 F.3d 1168, 1175–76 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding that the estoppel provision for
IPRs does not constitute an injury in fact when the appellant is not engaged in activity “that would give
rise to a possible infringement suit”); Altaire Pharm., Inc. v. Paragon Bioteck, Inc., 889 F.3d 1274,
1282–83 (Fed. Cir. 2018). When the touchstone of preclusion is whether a party already had the
opportunity to be heard, it seems significant that, under particular circumstances, a petitioner may not
only be denied the opportunity to be heard by the PTAB, but may then also be found to lack standing to
be heard at the Federal Circuit regarding the PTAB’s potential due process violation. In such a case,
estoppel would be wrongfully applied to a petitioner at the district court, and the agency would
effectively have freedom to make intellectual property validity determinations without oversight.
9. 5 U.S.C. § 706; see also Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141–42 (2016);
SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359 (2018).
10. Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Abbott Labs. v.
Cordis Corp., 710 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 554(b)(3); see also Novartis AG v. Torrent Pharm. Ltd., 853 F.3d 1316, 1324 (Fed.
Cir. 2017).
12. Belden, 805 F.3d at 1080; Novartis, 853 F.3d at 1324 (internal citation omitted).
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the decision and whether the party was denied a meaningful opportunity to
respond to the new theory.13
For example, where the parties have argued a determinative issue in
their briefing (either of their own accord or because the issue was
introduced in the institution decision), the Federal Circuit has found that
the parties were given meaningful opportunity to be heard.14 But where the
basis for the PTAB’s final decision has been introduced at oral arguments,
or as a new argument in the reply with no opportunity for sur-reply, the
Federal Circuit has found a due process and APA violation. 15 These
conclusions are in line with the traditional analysis of due process.16 It is
worth noting is that the “new theory” must serve as the basis for the final
written decision—where new factual grounds regarding a reference already
at issue have merely been used as motivation to combine or to describe the
state of the art, the Federal Circuit has found no violation.17
In its previous decisions, the Federal Circuit has placed special
significance on whether the PTAB has been inconsistent between its
findings in the institution decision and the final written decision—

13. See Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, 818 F.3d 1293, 1301–02 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding that a
party was denied its procedural rights when the PTAB based its decision on a factual assertion
introduced at oral argument, after the party “could meaningfully respond”); Novartis, 853 F.3d at 1325–
26 (finding no due process violation when the PTAB rejected a reference as anticipatory in the
institution decision, but relied on the reference in a final written decision for motivation to combine two
other references because the PTAB had not been inconsistent and the parties had been heard regarding
the very same issue); Securus Techs., Inc. v. Global Tel*Link Corp., 685 F. App’x 979, 985–86 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (finding no due process violation when the Board based its decision on an argument in
petitioner’s reply brief, which clarified an argument found in the petition, and when the patent owner
did not exhaust his procedural options to be heard on the issue); Belden, 805 F.3d at 1080–82 (finding
no due process violation when party did not use the regulatory safeguards of due process to request an
opportunity to be heard); In re NuVasive, 841 F.3d 966, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding due process
violation when a party was denied its request to respond to an argument raised in the reply brief and
was therefore denied the opportunity to be heard on a new issue); Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. Ltd.
P’ship v. Biomarin Pharm. Inc., 825 F.3d 1360, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding no APA violation
when references cited in the final written decision merely served to describe the state of the art and did
not serve as invalidating references).
14. E.g., BASF Corp. v. Iancu, No. 2017-1425, 2018 WL 3456307, at *6 (Fed. Cir. July 17, 2018)
(finding no due process violation where the basis for the final written decision was introduced in the
petition, acknowledged in the institution decision, and discussed at oral argument); Anacor Pharms.,
Inc. v. Iancu, No. 2017-1947, 2018 WL 2187768, at *4–6 (Fed. Cir. May 14, 2018).
15. Dell Inc., 818 F.3d at 1301–02; In re NuVasive, 841 F.3d at 970. But see Securus Techs., Inc.,
685 F. App’x at 985–86 (finding that because the parties had been given an opportunity to be heard
regarding the PTAB’s new interpretation of the prior art, the APA’s requirements were satisfied).
16. Nicholas J. Doyle, Confirmation Bias and the Due Process of Inter Partes Review, 57 THE J.
OF THE FRANKLIN PIERCE CTR. FOR INTELL. PROP. 29, 41–43 (2017) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 346 (1976)).
17. Novartis, 853 F.3d at 1325–26; Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. Ltd. P’ship, 825 F.3d at 1366–
67.
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circumstances which would indicate a “change [in] theories in
midstream.” 18 When such an inconsistency occurs, the parties must be
given the opportunity to respond to the change; otherwise, the PTAB
commits a possible due process violation. These opinions demonstrate that
for any question of due process, the analysis will focus on where and when
the case-dispositive issue was first raised and whether that provided the
responding party with sufficient notice and an opportunity to meaningfully
respond in either its briefing or oral arguments.
C. SAS Effects & The Increased Risk for Due Process Violations
It is in each party’s self-interest to ensure that its briefs sufficiently
develop the arguments supporting its position to provide the basis for a
final written decision that will not be overturned due to an APA violation.19
As always, petitioners must be certain to raise all arguments and claim
construction positions in the petition or they must be ready to forfeit the
right to rely on “new arguments” later in the reply.20 But now, as explained
below, the decision in SAS II has erected an increased hurdle for patent
owners to avoid institution. Because of the reduced incentive for the PTAB
to provide complete analysis in its institution decisions on all claims and on
all grounds, it is more important than ever that patent owners forgo the
temptation to skip a preliminary response, to help ensure that their
counterarguments and claim construction positions are fully developed and
available to provide a permissible basis for patentability determinations at
final written decision.
D. Brief Summary of SAS and What It Means for PTAB Practice
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in SAS II rejected the propriety
of the “partial institution” practice previously followed by the PTAB to
sometimes institute on only some of the challenged claims. 21 While the
decision whether to institute review remains discretionary following SAS II,
the Court emphasized the fact that it is the petition, not the Board, that
defines the scope of the review if it is instituted.22 Based on this holding,
18. Novartis, 853 F.3d at 1324–26; Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. Ltd. P’ship, 825 F.3d at 1366–
67.
19. See supra Part II.B.
20. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (2012); Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d
1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
21. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358–59 (2018).
22. Id. at 1355.
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the PTAB’s guidance following the release of the SAS II decision, and
recent Federal Circuit guidance, all claims and grounds will now rise or fall
as one at the institution stage.23
The relevant statutory language affords the PTAB discretion as to how
much information it includes in its institution decision. 24 The PTAB has
confirmed this reading of the statute, concluding that analysis of only one
representative claim in an institution decision does not constitute an abuse
of discretion.25 But the Federal Circuit has implied that guidance by the
PTAB in its institution decision is necessary to avoid a due process
violation. 26 On appeal from a final written decision in EmeraChem
Holdings, LLC v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., the Federal Circuit
found that the PTAB’s statements in its institution decision did not make
clear that it was relying on a particular prior art reference to invalidate the
dependent claims, as well as the independent claims discussed in its
decision to institute.27 When the PTAB relied on the reference in its final
written decision as a primary invalidating piece of prior art, the Federal
Circuit found that the parties were never “on notice” and the PTAB had
violated the patent owner’s due process right to be heard.28 Thus, the PTAB
has the power to shape and direct the parties as to what case-determinative
issues should be included in the briefing by providing a fulsome analysis in
its institution decision, but it is not required to do so.
E. Potential Due Process and Administrative Procedure Act Concerns
As always, it remains important that petitioners continue to ensure that
all potential arguments are raised in the petition and to provide their
relevant claim construction positions under 37 C.F.R. § 42.204(b)(3).

23. Id. at 1354; PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2018); David
Ruschke, et al., Chat with the Chief on SAS, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 5–6 (Apr. 30, 2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/chat_with_chief_sas_5.3.18.pdf.
24. 35 U.S.C. § 318(a); PGS Geophysical, 891 F.3d at 1359–60; David Ruschke, et al., Chat with
the Chief on SAS, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Apr. 30, 2018) (unpublished conference call).
25. Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. v. Oyster Optics, LLC, No. IPR2018-00070, Paper 27 (P.T.A.B.
Aug. 31, 2018).
26. EmeraChem Holdings, LLC v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 859 F.3d 1341, 1348–50 (Fed.
Cir. 2017); see also Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 1303 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (Reyna, J., concurring) (noting that “regardless of whether the Board’s institution decisions
can be appealed, the Board cannot create a black box decisionmaking process”).
27. EmeraChem Holdings, LLC, 859 F.3d at 1348–50.
28. Id. at 1350–51.
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Should a petitioner fail to do so, it would lose the ability to make the
argument because the petition defines the scope of the review.29
The SAS II decision has increased the hurdle faced by patent owners in
opposing the institution of a PTAB proceeding and, at the same time, in at
least some senses disincentivizes patent owners from raising
counterarguments early on, in a preliminary response. This is because the
patent owner, under SAS II, will have to address and win on every claim
and every ground to avoid institution. 30 However, the need to develop
arguments early on in the proceedings remains even after SAS II, because,
as discussed above, only arguments upon which the parties have been heard
may serve as the PTAB’s basis for protecting the validity of a patent.
A particular example of this can be seen concerning claim
construction. While the analysis provided in an institution decision is
preliminary, the Federal Circuit has made it clear that the PTAB may not
inconsistently construe terms between its institution decision and final
written decision without giving the parties an opportunity to be heard,
because doing so would be an impermissible change of theories in
midstream. 31 Where a patent owner chooses not to file a preliminary
response, it may inadvertently delay the parties’ arrival at a focused claim
construction dispute, increase the risk that an argument is raised without
meaningful notice, and lose the ability to rely on an alternative construction
without a due process violation.
SAS II has also removed any general requirement for the PTAB to
analyze the relative strengths of the various challenges raised in a petition
in the institution decision because all claims and grounds will rise or fall as
one. 32 Following SAS II, the PTAB need only address one claim in its
institution decision, since a showing of reasonable likelihood of success as

29. Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355 (2018).
30. See supra Part II.D.; 37 C.F.R. § 42.107 (2016).
31. SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d on
other grounds, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018) (“What concerns us is not that the Board adopted a construction
in its final written decision, as the Board is free to do, but that the Board ‘change[d] theories in
midstream.’”) (quoting Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. Ericsson Inc., 686 F. App’x 900, 905–06 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding that
when the PTAB adopted a construction raised by neither party and first raised at oral argument, there
was no due process violation because the parties vigorously debated the issue at the hearing and neither
sought rehearing or a sur-reply). But when a party puts the construction at issue by disputing an initial
construction, the party is on notice that the PTAB could alter it. WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical
Corp., 889 F.3d 1308, 1328–30 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
32. SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1354; Ruschke et al., supra note 23.
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to even one claim will allow institution of the entire petition.33 Since the
SAS II decision issued, the majority of panels appear to be largely
continuing their practice of providing analysis of all claims and grounds in
their institution decisions, helping guide the focus of the parties’ briefing.34
But such analysis is not guaranteed. For example, in Alcatel-Lucent USA
Inc. v. Oyster Optics, LLC, the Board instituted inter partes review and
provided analysis of only one representative claim in its institution
decision.35 On request for rehearing, the Board quoted the Supreme Court’s
decision in SAS II, stating that “Section 314(a) does not require the Director
to evaluate every claim individually. Instead, it simply requires him to
decide whether the petitioner is likely to succeed on at least 1 claim.”36
Where the PTAB declines to provide guidance on all claims and all
grounds in its institution decisions, it may limit the permissible basis for
both patentability and unpatentability determinations in its final written
decision under the APA, should the PTAB recognize an issue or evidence
not directly addressed by the parties. The institution decision can help give
notice of, frame, and focus the parties’ subsequent briefing on casedispositive issues. For example, in Alcatel-Lucent, while explaining that
analysis of one claim was sufficient, the Board, in actuality, provided
additional guidance by discussing weaknesses in the preliminary response
and identifying a critical claim construction issue.37 Without the rehearing
order, the parties would never have received this initial evaluation. During
its preliminary analysis, the PTAB may develop an initial impression as to
particular weaknesses in the prior art or an appropriate claim
construction. 38 Should the parties fail to recognize the significance of a
case-dispositive issue, they may choose to focus the briefing elsewhere. If
the PTAB were to rule on the basis of such an issue, and it was not
included in the institution decision, the parties may not have been given a
full opportunity to be heard on the issue and one or both parties might have
grounds for an appeal under the APA.39
33. See SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1359.
34. Id.; See Ruschke et al., supra note 23 (encouraging panels to continue providing analysis of all
claims challenged).
35. Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. v. Oyster Optics, LLC, No. IPR2018-00070, Paper 27 (P.T.A.B. Aug.
31, 2018).
36. Id. at 4.
37. Id. at 5.
38. See generally Doyle, supra note 15.
39. Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2015); SAS Inst., Inc. v.
ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d on other grounds, (quoting Belden,
805 F.3d at 1080).
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III. PRACTICE POINTERS
The increased risk of due process violations resulting from SAS II
increases the importance that the parties ensure their right to be heard is
both satisfied and preserved. Moving forward, it continues to be important
that a petitioner raise all arguments in the petition or forfeit the right to rely
on the argument later in the proceeding. Despite the decision in SAS II and
the resulting hurdle at the institution phase, it is also now more important
that patent owners use their preliminary response to raise counterarguments
and claim construction positions, placing the petitioner on notice of the
same, and preserving the PTAB’s ability to rely on such positions as a basis
for finding patentability without violating a petitioner’s due process rights.
Patent owners should pay special attention to claim construction
opportunities for all challenged claims at the institution stage. Given the
Federal Circuit’s determination that the Board may not come to
inconsistent claim construction determinations between the institution
decision and the final written decision without the parties having an
opportunity to be heard,40 winning a preliminary claim construction at the
institution stage could be significant.
Both parties must be vigilant for due process violations, and either use
the procedural safeguards of the PTAB proceedings to address them or face
waiver or forfeiture. To appeal a decision under the APA, a party must be
able to show that it was denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard on a
case-dispositive issue.41 That is, the party must preserve its right to appeal
by using the procedures available to it, including requesting leave to file a
motion for observation of evidence, leave to file a sur-reply to address new
evidence and argument, or a rehearing of a final written decision based on a
new factual basis.42 The Federal Circuit has made it clear that if parties do
not avail themselves of the procedural safeguards built into the PTAB
proceedings to request an opportunity to be heard, then they are not
necessarily denied the right to be heard and no due process violation may
have occurred.43 To ensure that an appeal of a due process violation is not
40. SAS I, 825 F.3d at 1351.
41. Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, 818 F.3d 1293, 1301–02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); In re NuVasive, 841
F.3d 966, 970-71 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
42. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.51(b)(2)(i), 42.20(b), 42.71(d) (2015); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77
Fed. Reg. 48756, 48767–68 (Aug. 14, 2012).
43. Belden, 805 F.3d at 1082 (“With no Board denial of concrete, focused requests before us, we
are not prepared to find that Belden was denied a meaningful opportunity to respond to the grounds of
rejection . . .”); In re NuVasive, 841 F.3d at 970 (finding a due process violation where a party’s request
to respond to an argument raised in the reply brief was denied); Securus Techs., Inc. v. Global Tel*Link
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waived or forfeited, it is imperative that the parties are aware of their
procedural rights and seek to timely vindicate them in the PTAB after a
violation has occurred.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the possibility of less analysis occurring at the institution stage,
the risk for due process violations has only increased post-SAS II. Both the
PTAB and the parties must make an effort to be forthcoming with their
prior art positions, evidence, and claim construction positions, and parties
must take advantage of procedural protections to preserve their right to
appeal a due process violation.

Corp., 685 F. App’x 979, 985–86 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding no due process violation where patent owner
did not exhaust its procedural options to be heard on the issue).

